Introduction
Today's military forces face asymmetrical threats arrayed throughout a non-linear battle field environment. No longer are enemy and friendly forces positioned in a linear fashion with a clearly defined forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). In years past, friendly forces enjoyed some semblance of security in the rear area, as hostilities were typically associated with the -frontline.‖ United States Air Forces (USAF) were typically positioned in areas well behind the FEBA, operating in a relatively permissive environment. Today's environment has USAF forces stationed and operating directly in the midst of the non-linear battle-space, especially in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).
As the operational mission in Iraq shifted from a regime change to stability operations,
U.S. forces shifted their strategy to a new type of mission, Counterinsurgency (COIN). Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines
COIN as the -comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.
1 Deployed in the heart of the non-linear battle-space environment, USAF members now find themselves in the midst of ongoing COIN operations. U.S. airpower assets provide unique capabilities to COIN operations in the form of both kinetic and non-kinetic support. However, there is a seam in USAF doctrine and training for support and synchronization of COIN operations on the ground. The typical ‗air-centric' approach to presenting USAF air and space power to combatant commanders has lost sight of the fact that Airmen are engaged in COIN operations on the ground. The USAF needs to improve its existing policy and guidance, as well as enhance its training and education on USAF COIN capabilities to account for Airmen on the ground. This paper will examine how the USAF is engaged in COIN operations on the ground. This paper intentionally avoids the prevalent -air-mindedness‖ approach; rather focusing on Airmen on the ground. This paper will show that the USAF is not currently on the best glide slope with regard to executing the ground aspect of COIN operations, lacking both doctrinal guidance and training for its Airmen. This paper will first provide a brief overview of COIN operations and show how Airmen are engaged in COIN operations on the ground. Discussions in this area will highlight how Airmen operate in the non-linear battle-space and are an invaluable asset to the battle-space owner (BSO). Discussion will then move to current COIN doctrine, showing a lack of USAF ground specific guidance. Next, this paper will discuss current training for Airmen operating in the deployed environment, showing a lack of preparedness for Airmen to be effective in COIN operations on the ground. The paper will conclude with recommendations including the need to update existing doctrinal guidance, a push to enhance training with regard to COIN operations, as well as a recommendation for developing a wing level organizational structure to support COIN operations on the ground. The backdrop of this paper will call upon the USAF experience at Joint Base Balad (JBB), Iraq and how the 332d Air Expeditionary Wing discovered a seam in the USAF ability to synchronize COIN operations on the ground.
Airmen and COIN On The Ground
The battlefields of today are much different from times past. U.S. military forces operate on a non-linear battlefield comprised of a host of asymmetrical threats. In previous eras, U.S. air bases were located in the rear area, well behind conventional forces arrayed in a classic force-on- The 332d Air Expeditionary Wing was assigned Base Operating and Support Integration (BOS-I) responsibilities at JBB. As such, complete integration with the BSO for base security purposes was a necessity. Along with this came the need to integrate with the BSO to support the on-going COIN campaign plan. JBB interacted with the local populace on numerous levels.
The base provided a large source of employment through various contract mechanisms hiring local citizens from surrounding communities which provided valuable service and support on the installation. The 332 AEW was also involved with various construction projects which included a medical treatment facility and local police station located off the installation for use by the host nation personnel. Additionally, the 332 AEW routinely treated local populace trauma cases ranging from vehicle accidents, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) injuries, and gunshot injuries. The wing also partnered with local national nurses and doctors, allowing them to participate in medical procedures on base and gain health care services advice for use in the local communities. JBB also sponsored -Kid's Day‖ events, where children from the local areas were brought on base and entertained through various demonstrations and interactions with American servicemen and women. In addition, the 332 AEW was responsible for Outside the Wire (OTW) security, combating the indirect weapons fire threat, as well as controlling entry onto the installation; both of which involved daily contact with the local population.
Returning to the notion of COIN operations, using military, economic, and civic actions to defeat an insurgency, the various missions depicted above offer some show that Airmen are reflects an Airman's desire to avoid the carnage of ground-force engagements wherever possible. Moreover, whereas soldiers and marines may seek the -close fight,‖ airmen look for opportunities to obtain the desired effects from long distance-that is, without giving the enemy the opportunity to close.‖ 15 In analyzing the USAF's minimal direct references to FM 3-24, it can be argued that the USAF is missing the point that Airmen are in fact -boots on the ground‖ engaged in COIN operations. In today's non-linear battlefield, Airmen live and operate on the ground in the midst of ongoing COIN operations. Although the USAF has developed doctrinal guidance to prepare its forces to execute both kinetic and non-kinetic air and space-centric support to COIN operations, it has failed to develop the same doctrinal guidance to support its ground-based Airmen.
USAF COIN Training
The USAF has come a long way in preparing its Airmen for deployment operations over the last decade. Recognizing the emergence of the non-linear battle-space and the fact that Airmen find themselves performing operations in hostile environments, the USAF has taken significant steps to train its Airmen on necessary combat skills. However, there remains a gap in USAF training with regard to COIN operations. Detailed below is a brief discussion on how USAF training fails to prepare Airmen on COIN operations. The shortfall with the training requirements outlined in the USAF tiered training approach is that there is little to no specific COIN training for the bulk of Airmen deploying into present day combat environments. A review of the training curriculum shows some cultural The lack of specific COIN training, coupled with the lack of specific ground-focused doctrine and guidance discussed previously, combine to create a gap in USAF Airmen's ability to effectively conduct and support COIN operations. Below are recommendations on how to bridge this gap.
Recommendations
The USAF should do three things to bridge the gap between the doctrine, training, and reality outlined above. They are: adjusting existing doctrinal guidance, institutionalizing specific COIN training for all Airmen, and adopting a wing level COIN organizational structure.
These recommendations are discussed in detail below. In addition to updating its COIN doctrine, the USAF must also adjust existing training requirements. As mentioned previously, current USAF EST does not include necessary COIN training. All four EST tiers should be targeted to include necessary levels of COIN training. 
Conclusion
Today's battle-space environment has changed significantly from its traditional linear to a non-linear battlefield with a host of asymmetrical threats strewn throughout. In today's dynamic environment, the emergence of new missions has become the norm. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrated these issues facing our military forces. The re-emergence of COIN operations in today's battlefields has taught our military forces several valuable lessons. There is little doubt that USAF airpower plays a pivotal role in supporting COIN operations. However, from the ground perspective, there appears to be a significant seam in the USAF preparation and ability to conduct ground-based COIN operations using USAF Airmen, despite the fact the USAF has been and currently is engaged in both direct and indirect support of ongoing COIN operations. The typical -Airmindeness‖ approach to presenting USAF air and space power to combatant commanders has lost sight of the fact that Airmen are engaged in COIN operations on the ground. The USAF must overcome these obstacles. As Robert McLaughlin points out in his article ‗Counterinsurgency and the Surge in Iraq: Balancing Doctrine and Strategy', -it is imperative that military leaders at all levels become experts at operating as counterinsurgents.‖ 25 In an attempt to become such experts in COIN, this paper provides the USAF three recommendations. First, USAF doctrinal guidance on COIN operations needs to be adjusted.
The USAF should develop a stand-alone COIN doctrine document which capitalizes on the kinetic and non-kinetic roles air and space power contribute to COIN operations, while simultaneously providing guidance to the Airmen on the ground engaged in the COIN effort.
Second, adjustments in Expeditionary Skills Training need to be made, providing specific COIN training for all Airmen. Finally, the USAF needs to develop and adopt a formal wing level COIN synchronization construct in order to effectively execute COIN support missions on the ground.
The 332d Air Expeditionary Wing assigned stationed at Joint Base Balad, Iraq learned these lessons firsthand, while executing its role in OIF. Currently, the USAF is not on the appropriate glide slope with regard to its ability to effectively execute COIN operations. With necessary changes in doctrine, training, and wing organizational structure, the USAF can revector to the appropriate glide slope, ensuring a direct hit on target; effective USAF Airmen COIN operations on the ground.
